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INTRODUCTION 
Most of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution sets forth mundane 
presidential responsibilities or powers. Section 3 prescribes the President’s duty 
“from time to time” to report to Congress on “the State of the Union” and to 
recommend to that body “such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
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expedient.”1 It also gives the President discretion to call an adjourned Congress 
back into session and, when the Houses cannot agree about adjournment, to 
“adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.”2 And while one must go to 
the Appointments Clause in Section 2 in order to find the power actually to 
appoint “Officers of the United States,”3 Section 3 makes clear that it is the 
President who must sign their commissions.4 That latter section also prescribes 
the presidential duty to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” which 
Hamilton described as a ministerial duty largely “without consequence.”5 
Nestled amidst this set of largely technical provisions is one that has 
become an “elephant[] in [a] mousehole”6—the Take Care Clause.7 In simple 
but delphic terms, the clause states that the President “shall take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”8 Today, at least, no one can really know why 
the Framers included such language or placed it where they did.9 Phrased in 
a passive voice, the clause seems to impose upon the President some sort of 
duty to exercise unspecified means to get those who execute the law, whoever 
they may be, to act with some sort of fidelity that the clause does not define.10 
Through a long and varied course of interpretation, however, the Court has 
read that vague but modest language, in the alternative, either as a source of 
vast presidential power or as a sharp limitation on the powers of both the 
President and the other branches of government. 
Consider the following examples: First, and perhaps most prominently, the 
Court has relied on the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed” to establish the power to remove officers who do not follow 
 
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
4 Id. art. II, § 3. 
5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In 
contrast with that assessment, the Court in Zivotofsky v. Kerry relied on this clause in part to conclude 
that the President had the power to recognize foreign nations. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085 (2015). 
6 We borrow the Court’s apt phrase for the presumption that a lawmaking body does not usually 
alter fundamental features of a legal regime through “vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one 
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
8 Id. 
9 It is possible, as others have done, to identify where in the drafting process the clause came 
into the document. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 64-68 (1994) (noting the clause’s emergence in the Committee 
on Style and tracing the evolution of similar language which preceded it). But those in the 
constitutionmaking process said next to nothing about either the clause’s understood meaning or the 
purpose it was to serve in the constitutional scheme. See id. at 63 (“[A]t the founding, the clause 
received relatively little consideration by practically everyone in the debate. Hamilton devoted only 
a few lines in the Federalist Papers to discussion of this ‘minor’ executive power or responsibility.”). 
10 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1875-78 (2015)  
(noting that the clause’s use of passive voice necessarily contemplates law administration by someone 
other than the President). 
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the President’s directives.11 Second, the Court has used the Take Care Clause 
to define the limits of Article III standing, holding that the constitutional 
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability help to ensure that the 
President rather than the federal judiciary retains primary responsibility for the 
legality of executive decisions.12 Third, the Court has treated the Take Care 
Clause as the source of the President’s prosecutorial discretion13—a power that, 
as recent events have shown us, may give the President room to reshape the 
effective reach of laws enacted by Congress.14 Fourth, the Court has treated the 
Take Care Clause as the direct constitutional source of the President’s 
obligation to respect legislative supremacy.15 Indeed, the Court has read the 
clause as a negation of any presidential power to dispense with or suspend 
federal law.16 Fifth, in at least one high profile case, the Court has read the Take 
Care Clause as the source of inherent presidential authority to take acts 
 
11 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) 
(“The President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the 
faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (“As 
[the President] is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] be faithfully executed, the 
reasonable implication . . .  must be, in the absence of any express limitation respecting removals, 
that as his selection of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so 
must be his power of removing those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.”). 
12 See, e.g., Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (asserting that to allow Congress 
to “convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into 
an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to 
the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed’”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (“The Constitution, after all, assigns 
to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.’ We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this case without running afoul 
of that structural principle.” (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)). 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (concluding that the Attorney 
General and U.S. Attorneys have wide prosecutorial discretion “because they are designated by statute 
as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 
(1985) (“[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the 
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded 
as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the 
Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)). 
14 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 686 
(2014) (discussing the Obama Administration’s reliance on prosecutorial discretion to justify 
categorical forbearance from prosecution under “federal marijuana laws,” “enforcement of [the 
Affordable Care Act’s] statutory penalties for employers,” and enforcement of “removal statutes and 
employment prohibitions against certain undocumented immigrants”). 
15 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“In the framework 
of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the 
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”). 
16 See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (rejecting the 
notion that “the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a 
power to forbid their execution”). 
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necessary to protect the operations of the federal government, even in cases in 
which no statute provides explicit authority to do so.17 
Two things stand out about the Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause to 
serve so many ends simultaneously. The first is that, in each of these contexts, the 
Court treats the meaning of the clause as obvious when it is anything but that. 
The Court’s decisions rely heavily on the Take Care Clause but almost never 
interpret it, at least not in any conventional way. The Court does not typically 
parse the text of the clause or try to situate it in the broader constitutional 
structure that gives it context. Nor does the Court typically examine the clause’s 
historical provenance (except to invoke an almost equally conclusory set of 
interpretations by members of the First Congress in the Decision of 1789).18 
The second striking element is that the functions that the Court ascribes to 
the Take Care Clause are often in unacknowledged tension with one another. For 
instance, deriving a strong prosecutorial discretion from the clause may collide 
with the scruple against dispensation that the Court also reads into it.19 Similarly, 
the Court has said that the Take Care Clause precludes presidential lawmaking 
while also finding that the clause justifies the exercise of a presidential completion 
power—an implied presidential authority to prescribe extrastatutory means 
when necessary to execute a statute.20 The internal tensions, moreover, often give 
rise to doctrines that ask for judgments of degree—line drawing that does not 
lend itself readily to judicially manageable standards. 
A brief Article is no place to try to fill all the interpretive and analytical 
gaps in the Court’s Take Care Clause jurisprudence or to wade into the rich 
debates that have engaged legal scholars, if not the Court. Instead, the Article 
brings together various doctrines in order to show that the Court uses the Take 
Care Clause as a placeholder for more abstract and generalized reasoning about 
the appropriate role of the President in a system of separation of powers. It also 
sketches lines of inquiry that the Court might pursue if it were ever to approach 
the Take Care Clause seriously on the clause’s own terms. 
Part I describes five of the Court’s structural doctrines that rely on the Take 
Care Clause. In order to draw attention to the Court’s methodological approach 
 
17 See Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1890) (recognizing the President’s inherent authority 
to provide a bodyguard to protect a federal judge despite the lack of any explicit statutory authority). 
18 See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 111-15 (1926); see also infra text accompanying note 167. 
19 This past Term, in granting certiorari to review other questions arising out of a challenge by 
several states to the Obama Administration’s program of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), the Court propounded a question about whether the 
prosecutorial guidance issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security concerning certain classes of 
undocumented immigrants violated the Take Care Clause. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 
(5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). The Court, however, had no occasion to resolve 
the Take Care Clause question because it affirmed the lower court’s judgment by an equally divided 
Court. See United States v. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2106); see also infra text accompanying note 176. 
20 See infra Section I.E. 
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to the clause, it emphasizes the tools the Court does or does not bring to bear on 
construing the clause. Part II shows the high level of generality at which the 
Court reads the clause. If the Court wishes to use the clause as more than a 
marker for freestanding separation-of-powers analysis, this Article suggests 
several question’s the Court must resolve about the clause’s import. 
I. THE CASE LAW 
A. The Removal Power 
The Court has repeatedly relied on the Take Care Clause to justify the 
idea that the President must retain at least some control over those who 
execute the laws, notwithstanding a statute limiting presidential authority 
over the law’s administrators. Though the Court had adverted to the idea 
before,21 Chief Justice Taft’s opinion for the Court in Myers v. United States 
gave the fullest account of the notion that the presidential duty to oversee 
faithful execution of the laws implied a presidential power to remove those 
who executed them.22 At issue was a statute that prohibited the President 
from removing a postmaster first class without first securing the advice and 
consent of the Senate. President Wilson had fired Myers, the postmaster in 
Portland, without the requisite Senate approval, and Myers sued for 
backpay.23 The government defended on the ground that the President had a 
constitutional right to remove Myers without the Senate’s approval.24 
In a seventy-one page opinion for six members of the Court, Chief Justice 
Taft found illimitable presidential authority to remove an executive officer, at 
least one who was appointed by the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. His holding rested, in part, on the conclusion that the 
Vesting Clause of Article II25 assigned the President the same “executive” 
removal authority that the common law had invested in the Crown and that 
the Articles of Confederation had given the old Congress.26 The Court also 
invoked a course of governmental practice that stretched from 1789 until the 
 
21 See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 317 (1903) (“In making removals from office it must 
be assumed that the President acts with reference to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws 
are faithfully executed, and we think it would be a mistaken view to hold that the mere specification in 
the statute of some causes for removal thereby excluded the right of the President to remove for any 
other reason which he, acting with a due sense of his official responsibility, should think sufficient.”). 
22 272 U.S. 52, 106-178 (1926). 
23 Id. at 106. 
24 Id. at 108. 
25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States . . . .”). 
26 Myers, 272 U.S. at 110, 118. 
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enactment of the Tenure in Office Act during the struggle between President 
Andrew Johnson and the Republican Congress during Reconstruction.27 
The Court’s opinion also relied centrally on the Take Care Clause. Chief 
Justice Taft invoked that clause to hammer home the implication that a 
President charged with exercising all of the executive power must have the 
means to control subordinates through whom he or she would necessarily act: 
As [the President] is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] be faithfully 
executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was 
that as part of his executive power he should select those who were to act for him 
under his direction in the execution of the laws. The further implication must be, 
in the absence of any express limitation respecting removals, that as his selection 
of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must 
be his power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible.28 
Taft’s opinion buttressed this structural reading of Article II by noting 
that the President can “fulfill the [take care] duty” only through subordinates 
who “aid him in the performance of the great duties of his office and represent 
him in a thousand acts to which it can hardly be supposed his personal 
attention is called.”29 In matters of foreign relations, Chief Justice Taft 
thought it obvious that, because “the discretion to be exercised is that of the 
President in determining the national public interest . . . . his cabinet officers 
must do his will” on pain of removal.30 But he saw no basis for distinguishing 
between the President’s power to remove an officer who “discharges a political 
duty of the President or exercises his discretion” and one who “engage[s] in 
the discharge of their other normal duties.”31 By virtue of Article II’s 
assignment of the executive power to the President alone, he or she might 
“properly supervise and guide [officers’] construction of the statutes under 
which they act in order to secure . . . unitary and uniform execution of the 
laws.”32 And this meant that the President had to have the power to remove 
officers that he or she found to be “negligent and inefficient.”33 
To be sure, if a statute “specifically committed [a given set of decisions] to 
the discretion of a particular officer” or established a “quasi-judicial . . . 
executive tribunal[] whose decisions after hearing affect [the] interests of 
individuals,” then Congress might properly foreclose the President from 
 
27 Id. at 111-64 (discussing the history of executive power during the three-quarters of a century 
after the Constitution’s adoption). 
28 Id. at 117. 
29 Id. at 133 (quoting Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890)). 
30 Id. at 134. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 135. 
33 Id. 
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intervening in the decision of a particular case.34 Even then, however, the 
President could remove such an officer after the fact “on the ground that the 
discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the 
whole intelligently or wisely exercised.”35 Without the power to remove officers 
at some point, Taft reasoned, the President “does not discharge his own 
constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.”36 In short, 
reading a removal power into the grant of executive power was necessary to 
enable the President to fulfill the take care obligation also found in Article II. 
In well-known later cases that blessed independent administrative 
agencies, the Court implicitly or explicitly backed away from Taft’s broad 
view of the “take care” obligation. Less than a decade after Myers, the Court 
in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States upheld restrictions on the President’s 
authority to remove Federal Trade Commissioners.37 Declaring the classic 
regulatory functions of administrative agencies to be quasi-legislative and 
quasi-judicial rather than executive, the Court sustained the removal 
restrictions without so much as mentioning the Take Care Clause.38 In Wiener 
v. United States,39 which upheld restrictions on the President’s power to 
remove members of the War Claims Commission, the Court made it explicit 
that, contra Taft’s dicta, the Take Care Clause does not govern quasi-judicial 
functions but applies only to purely executive ones.40 
The Take Care Clause reclaimed its pivotal place when the Court decided 
Morrison v. Olson,41 which upheld a “good cause” restriction on the President’s 
power to remove independent counsels—special prosecutors appointed to 
investigate certain kinds of criminal wrongdoing by high-level government and 
party officials. Morrison started by rejecting Humphrey’s Executor’s distinction 
between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, on the one hand, and 
executive functions, on the other.42 As a recent case had made clear, any federal 
official (other than an Article III judge) who interpreted the law to implement 
a statutory mandate was performing an executive function.43 Hence, Morrison 
pegged the validity of the removal restriction on the simple question of whether 
it “interfere[d] with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 295 U.S. 602, 630-32 (1935). 
38 Id. at 624. 
39 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
40 See id. at 352 (noting that the Humphrey’s Executor Court “narrowly confined the scope of the 
Myers decision”). 
41 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
42 Id. at 689. 
43 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to 
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”). 
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constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed’ under Article II.”44 
Despite the removal restriction in the independent counsel statute, the 
Court concluded that the statutory scheme did not “impermissibly burden” the 
President’s Article II powers.45 In an oddly constructed sentence, the Court 
wrote, “[t]his is not a case in which the power to remove an executive official has 
been completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the 
President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”46 Because the Attorney 
General could fire an independent counsel for “good cause,” the President 
“retain[ed] ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently performing 
his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the 
provisions of the [independent counsel statute].”47 In addition, though the Court 
would not specify fully what counts as “good cause,” it noted that the legislative 
history made clear that the term at least covers “misconduct.”48 Hence, the Court 
implied that the “take care” duty encompasses the duty to ensure competence, 
observance of law, and prevention of misconduct. 
Finally, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,49 
the Court again relied on the Take Care Clause to identify a novel limit on “good 
cause” removal—a prohibition against “two-tiered” good cause limitations. At 
issue was the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)—an 
entity established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to regulate the accounting industry 
by exercising rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication authority.50 Congress 
placed the PCAOB under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) but authorized the SEC to remove PCAOB members only 
for carefully defined forms of “good cause.”51 This created a difficulty because the 
Court assumed, based on party stipulations, that the President could remove 
SEC Commissioners only for good cause.52 Whatever the validity of either 
removal restriction standing alone, two tiers proved too much: 
The President cannot “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” if he cannot 
oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them. Here the President 
 
44 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690. 
45 Id. at 692. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-452, at 37 (1987)). 
49 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
50 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-24, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750-53. 
51 The Act provided that the SEC had “good cause” to remove a PCAOB member only if such 
official “willfully violated” specified laws, “willfully abused” his or her authority, or failed to enforce 
the law “without reasonable justification or excuse.” 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2012). 
52 The Court assumed that the President could remove the SEC Commissioner only for 
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496 (quoting 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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cannot remove an officer who enjoys more than one level of good-cause 
protection, even if the President determines that the officer is neglecting his 
duties or discharging them improperly. That judgment is instead committed to 
another officer, who may or may not agree with the President’s determination, 
and whom the President cannot remove simply because that officer disagrees with 
him. This contravenes the President’s “constitutional obligation to ensure the 
faithful execution of the laws.”53 
In the Court’s view, if the SEC could remove PCAOB members at will, then 
the SEC “would be fully responsible for what the Board does,” and “[t]he 
President could . . . hold the Commission to account for its supervision of the 
Board, to the same extent that he may hold the Commission to account for 
everything else it does.”54 Since the SEC could only remove PCAOB members 
for cause, the President could affect the PCAOB’s decisions only if he or she 
could determine that the SEC “unreasonabl[y]” decided that it lacked good cause 
to fire members of the PCAOB.55 Under that arrangement, the Court reasoned, 
the President “can neither ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held 
responsible for a Board member’s breach of faith.”56 
 
53 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693). 
54 Id. at 495-96. 
55 Id. at 496.  
56 Id. Starting from similar premises, the Court in Printz v. United States relied in part on the Take 
Care Clause to reject congressional power to “commandeer” state officials to enforce federal law. 521 
U.S. 898, 922 (1997). At issue was the validity of the Federal Brady Act, which required state law 
enforcement officers to conduct background checks of gun purchasers in order to determine whether 
the putative buyer’s receipt or possession of a firearm would be unlawful. Id. at 903 (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(s)(2) (1994)). After finding that such a requirement impermissibly intrudes upon state 
sovereignty, the Court further concluded that Congress’s attempt to impress state executive officials 
into federal service violates “the separation and equilibration of powers between the three branches of 
the Federal Government itself.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. In the Court’s words, 
The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by 
Congress; the President, it says, “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” 
Art. II, § 3, personally and through officers whom he appoints (save for such inferior 
officers as Congress may authorize to be appointed by the “Courts of Law” or by “the 
Heads of Departments” who are themselves Presidential appointees), Art. II, § 2. The 
Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of [state executive 
officers] in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful 
Presidential control (if indeed meaningful Presidential control is possible without the 
power to appoint and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal 
Executive—to ensure both vigor and accountability—is well known. . . . That unity 
would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if 
Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring 
state officers to execute its laws. 
 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 922-23 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Take Care Clause not only constrains 
control over the execution of federal law within the federal government, but also the allocation of 
executive responsibilities between federal and state governments. 
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B. Standing Doctrine 
The Court has repeatedly relied on the Take Care Clause to define the scope 
of Article III standing to sue.57 Standing doctrine, of course, defines what 
constitutes a “case” or “controversy” for Article III purposes.58 In recent years, 
the Court has made clear that a plaintiff who wishes to invoke “[t]he judicial 
Power of the United States”59 must assert a concrete factual injury,60 a chain of 
causation that links the defendant’s action to the harm alleged,61 and a 
reasonable probability that the relief sought will redress the harm alleged.62 
These criteria, as the Court has acknowledged, are too impressionistic to 
produce a predictable, formulaic body of judicial doctrine.63 Instead, the Court 
treats standing doctrine as a rough metric for capturing the proper role of the 
federal courts—something “more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and 
explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of 
an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”64 
Defining the role of the federal courts has inevitably entailed efforts by 
the Court to define the boundaries between the judiciary and the political 
branches. In setting the line between the executive and the judiciary, the 
Court has put the Take Care Clause front and center. In perhaps the first 
prominent example of this—Allen v. Wright—the Court denied standing to 
the parents of African-American schoolchildren who alleged that the Internal 
Revenue Service had failed to enforce a federal policy denying a charitable 
tax exemption to private schools that discriminated based on race in their 
admissions.65 The plaintiffs’ children had not applied to the private schools 
that engaged in the alleged discrimination.66 Rather, the children went to 
 
57 See, e.g., Leah M. Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1297 (2015) (noting 
cases in which the Court has held that a nonexecutive actor may not advance an “undifferentiated public 
interest” in federal court because Article III “requires the President alone to execute federal law”). 
58  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
59 Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
60 See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (reiterating that to maintain Article 
III standing, an asserted injury must be “real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 
(1979) (requiring that a plaintiff have suffered “actual or threatened injury” to satisfy Article III). 
61 See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976) (limiting standing to 
only those “injur[ies] that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant”). 
62 See, e.g., id. at 45-46 (concluding that a complaint must demonstrate a “substantial likelihood 
that victory in [the] suit” would remedy the injury alleged). 
63 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“[S]tanding doctrine incorporates 
concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition.”); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. 
United for the Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“The concept of ‘Art. III 
standing’ . . . cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition.”). 
64 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(Bork, J., concurring)). 
65 Id. at 752-53. 
66 Id. at 746. 
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public schools in school districts that were under desegregation orders, and 
the plaintiffs alleged that the IRS’s nonenforcement (1) demeaned them and 
(2) impeded desegregation by making it cheaper for white children to go to 
discriminatory private schools in the plaintiffs’ school districts.67 The 
plaintiffs relied on the Internal Revenue Code, Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.68 
The Court denied standing on the ground that the first claim of injury, 
which it described as “stigmatic,” was too abstract and widely shared to satisfy 
the requirement of concrete and individualized injury.69 On the second 
allegation of injury, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ contention—that 
withdrawal of the subsidy would materially affect either the policies of, or 
attendance at, the private schools—was too speculative to satisfy Article III.70 
Of importance here, the Court’s decision reflected a worry that recognizing 
standing in this case “would pave the way generally for suits challenging, not 
specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular 
programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations.”71 This 
possibility, in turn, implicated the separation of powers, in general, and the 
Take Care Clause, in particular. In the Court’s words: 
[The] principle [that an agency must have latitude to structure its own affairs], 
grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels against recognizing 
standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation 
works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the 
Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to the 
Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.” We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this 
case without running afoul of that structural principle.72 
Hence, the Court’s strict reading of injury and causation requirements was 
meant to filter out cases in which a plaintiff sought to vindicate the rule of 
law rather than adjudicate a concrete dispute whose resolution would remedy 
a particularized harm to him- or herself.73 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,74 the Court went a step farther by 
suggesting that the Take Care Clause constrains Congress’s authority to create 
 
67 Id. at 752-53. 
68 Id. at 745 n.12 (citing U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981, 2000d (1982)). 
69 Id. at 755-56. 
70 Id. at 756-61. 
71 Id. at 759. 
72 Id. at 761. 
73 Id. at 761 & n.26. 
74 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
1846 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1835 
rights of action to be vindicated in federal courts. At issue was whether the 
plaintiffs—two individual members of the Defenders of Wildlife—had 
standing to challenge an Interior Department regulation stating that federal 
funding restrictions embodied in the Endangered Species Act (ESA)75 do not 
apply to federally funded overseas projects.76 To support their claims of 
injury, the individual plaintiffs filed affidavits stating that they had previously 
visited two overseas sites to see endangered species (the Nile crocodile and 
the Asian elephant), that they intended to return to those venues someday to 
see those animals, and that federally funded projects in those areas threatened 
the species the plaintiffs intended to go back to see.77 
The Court in Lujan held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.78 In the 
Court’s view, the plaintiffs’ stated intention to return to the sites in question 
was too speculative and remote: “Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any 
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the 
some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury 
that our cases require.”79 It did not matter to the Court that Congress had 
included in the ESA a broad “citizen suit” provision that authorized “any 
person [to] commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person 
. . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.”80 
Although the plaintiffs clearly fell within that authorization, the Court 
thought it unconstitutional for Congress to grant standing to those who did 
not meet the minimum requisites identified in the Court’s standing cases. 
Allowing such lawsuits to proceed, the Court said, would effectively sanction 
a legislative intrusion upon the President’s Take Care responsibilities: 
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive 
officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in the courts 
is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief 
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,” Art. II, § 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of 
Congress, “to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another 
and co-equal department,” and to become “‘virtually continuing monitors of the 
wisdom and soundness of Executive action.’”81 
 
75 See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1531–1544. 
76 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557-58. 
77 Id. at 562-64. 
78 Id. at 578. 
79 Id. at 564. 
80 Id. at 571-72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012)). 
81 Id. at 577 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923); and Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)). 
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To be sure, the Court has since made clear that its “standing 
jurisprudence” ultimately “derives from Article III and not Article II.”82 But 
the Court’s decisions nonetheless use standing doctrine to patrol a perceived 
constitutional boundary between the executive and the judiciary. By the 
Court’s lights, those who seek to use the judiciary not to resolve some genuine 
dispute over some concrete interest, but rather to enforce the legality of 
government action, intrude upon what the Court regards as exclusive 
presidential authority to assure government officials’ fidelity to law. That 
separation-of-powers principle, which constrains both Congress and the 
courts, comes straight from the Take Care Clause. 
C. Prosecutorial Discretion 
The Court has invoked the Take Care Clause to justify finding that the 
President enjoys broad prosecutorial discretion. In Heckler v. Chaney,83 
prisoners who had been sentenced to capital punishment filed suit challenging 
the use of certain drugs for lethal injections on the ground that such use violated 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).84 The Court held, 
however, that the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA)85 preclude review of decisions by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) not to bring enforcement actions to stop use of the drugs at issue.86 In 
so holding, the Court reasoned that the discretion implicit in decisions not to 
enforce a statute lay beyond the power of courts to review under the APA: 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a 
number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must 
not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are 
best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it 
acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s 
overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake 
the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of 
the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the 
courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its 
priorities. Similar concerns animate the principles of administrative law that courts 
 
82 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000) 
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998)). 
83 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
84 21 U.S.C. § 301 – 399f (1982). 
85 In relevant part, the APA authorizes judicial review of final agency action “except to the 
extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012). 
86 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. 
1848 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1835 
generally will defer to an agency’s construction of the statute it is charged with 
implementing, and to the procedures it adopts for implementing that statute.87 
This discretion, the Court reasoned, made the FDA’s nonenforcement 
decision analogous to a prosecutor’s decision not to indict—an exercise of 
discretion protected by the Take Care Clause.88 As the Court put it: 
[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the 
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to 
indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the 
Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the 
Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”89 
Although the Court was technically construing the APA, its understanding 
of prosecutorial discretion under the Take Care Clause informed its reading 
of that open-ended statute. 
To similar effect was United States v. Armstrong,90 in which the Court 
rejected a request for discovery to support a claim of discriminatory and 
selective prosecution. To justify its relatively high threshold for discovery, the 
Court emphasized that such a claim asks a court “to exercise judicial power 
over a ‘special province’ of the Executive.”91 “The Attorney General and 
United States Attorneys,” the Court explained, “retain ‘broad discretion’ to 
enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.”92 These federal prosecutors “have this 
latitude because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to 
help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.’”93 Accordingly, to protect that constitutionally 
conferred discretion, the Court would apply a presumption of prosecutorial 
regularity unless there was “clear evidence to the contrary.”94 
D. Legislative Supremacy and the Antidispensation Principle 
The Supreme Court has also invoked the Take Care Clause as the textual 
source of the President’s duty to abide by and enforce the laws enacted by 
Congress—that is, as the instantiation of the President’s duty to respect 
legislative supremacy and not to act contra legem. The most famous 
expression of this idea came in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, also 
 
87 Id. at 831-32. 
88 Id. at 832. 
89 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
90 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
91 Id. at 464 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832). 
92 Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). 
93 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
94 Id. (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)). 
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known as the Steel Seizure Case.95 In the midst of the Korean Conflict, the 
Steelworkers called a nationwide strike over a dispute with management 
concerning working conditions.96 After various efforts to resolve the 
conflict sputtered, President Truman issued an executive order directing the 
Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation’s steel mills and to keep the 
output of steel flowing.97 The order contained findings that seizure of the 
mills was necessary to continue prosecuting the war effort.98 Although two 
defense-related statutes authorized the President to seize property in 
certain circumstances,99 the government argued that the conditions for 
invoking such authority had not been met here and stressed that the 
statutory seizure process, at least under one such statute, was “much too 
cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at 
hand.”100 The President, however, defended his action based on his inherent 
powers under Article II’s Vesting Clause,101 the Commander-in-Chief 
Power,102 and (you guessed it) the Take Care Clause.103 
After rejecting the government’s contention that the Commander-in-Chief 
power could justify such an assertion of presidential authority outside the 
theater of war, the Court relied on the Take Care Clause to reject the Truman 
Administration’s other claims of inherent constitutional authority: 
 Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional 
provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our 
Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed 
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions 
in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the 
vetoing of laws he thinks bad . . . .  
 The President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed 
in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be 
executed in a manner prescribed by the President.104 
Separate opinions by members of the Youngstown majority expressed a like 
sentiment about the Take Care Clause—that it obliges the President to respect 
 
95 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
96 Id. at 583. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 589-95 (reproducing Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3140 (Apr. 10, 1952)). 
99 Id. at 586 n.2 (citing The Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 759, 62 Stat. 604, 625-
627 codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 468 (1952 & Supp. IV); The Defense Production Act of 1950, tit. 
II, Pub. L. No. 774, 64 Stat. 798 codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2081 (1952)). 
100 Id. at 586. 
101 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
102 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
103 Id. art. II, § 3. 
104 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88. 
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the means and ends of statutory policy power specified by Congress. In his 
famous concurrence, Justice Jackson wrote that the clause confers on the 
President “a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law,” thereby 
“signify[ing] . . . that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we 
submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”105 To similar effect, Justice 
Frankfurter quoted Justice Holmes for the proposition that “[t]he duty of the 
President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the 
laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his 
power.”106 Likewise, in Justice Douglas’s words, any authority conferred by the 
clause “starts and ends with the laws Congress has enacted.”107 These opinions 
rejected the broader view, reflected in Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent, that a 
“practical construction” of the Take Care Clause gave the President broad 
flexibility to prescribe appropriate “mode[s] of execution” for the “mass of 
legislation” on the books—authority that, according to Vinson, authorized the 
President to seize the steel mills to ensure the fulfillment of statutes 
appropriating money for the procurement of war materiel.108 
Almost a century before Youngstown, the Court had also treated the Take Care 
Clause as an expression of another important principle of legislative supremacy—
namely, that the President has no dispensation power. At common law, the 
Crown had long claimed the prerogative to dispense with or suspend Acts of 
Parliament when equity so required.109 By the Glorious Revolution, English law 
had ceased to recognize such authority.110 In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 
the Court read the Take Care Clause as embodying this anti-dispensation 
principle in the Constitution.111 At issue was a petition for mandamus filed to 
compel the Postmaster General, Amos Kendall, to pay the full amount that 
Congress had appropriated by private bill for the sum claimed to be due on a 
contract that Stokes and others had made with the Post Office.112 In holding that 
 
105 Id. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
106 Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 
(1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
107 Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
108 Id. at 702 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
109 See, e.g., W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 30 (1965) 
(describing the king’s “royal power to dispense with the law to prevent violations of the higher law 
of equity”); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 278-79 (2009) 
(explaining the Crown’s power to both suspend the operation of statutes and grant to individuals 
the dispensation of not having to be bound by certain laws). 
110 See Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421, 
1425 (1999) (noting that in the Glorious Revolution, the English Bill of Rights “declared illegal 
certain actions of the crown, including its dispensing with laws”); see also GWYN, supra note 109, at 
30 (noting that the king’s dispensation power was no longer recognized by the end of the seventeenth 
century). 
111 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). 
112 Id. at 527-31. 
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mandamus was available to compel Kendall to pay the full amount specified in 
the Act of Congress, the Court considered and rejected the argument that  
the postmaster general was alone subject to the direction and control of the 
President, with respect to the execution of the duty imposed upon him by 
this law, and [that] this right of the President . . . [grew] out of the obligation 
imposed upon him by the constitution, to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.113 
Indeed, the Court concluded just the opposite: 
This is a doctrine that cannot receive the sanction of this court. It would be 
vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its 
support in any part of the constitution; and is asserting a principle, which, if 
carried out in its results, to all cases falling within it, would be clothing the 
President with a power entirely to control the legislation of congress, and 
paralyze the administration of justice. 
 To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws 
faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction 
of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.114  
In short, the Court has read the Take Care Clause to limit the President’s authority 
to act contra legem. 
E. Presidential “Completion Power” 
In a previous work, we described what we call the President’s “completion 
power”—implied executive authority, in the absence of an express statutory 
grant, to take “incidental” measures that may be necessary to effectuate 
statutory commands.115 In at least one well-known decision, In re Neagle, the 
Court relied directly on the Take Care Clause to justify the President’s 
exercise of the completion power.116 In Neagle, a deputy U.S. Marshal, David 
Neagle, was indicted for murder after shooting an assailant who seemingly 
posed an imminent threat to Justice Field, whom Neagle had been assigned 
to protect.117 At issue in Neagle’s subsequent habeas petition was whether 
Neagle was authorized to protect Justice Field, despite the lack of any statutory 
authorization to serve as a bodyguard to a Justice riding circuit, as Justice 
 
113 Id. at 612-13. 
114 Id. at 613. 
115 Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 
2302-03 (2006). 
116 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890). 
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Field was doing when attacked.118 Invoking the Take Care Clause, the Court 
found ample implied authority for the Attorney General to assign deputy 
marshal Neagle to the task: 
 The legislative branch of the government can only protect the judicial 
officers by the enactment of laws for that purpose, and the argument we are 
now combating assumes that no such law has been passed by Congress. 
  If we turn to the executive department of the government, we find a 
very different condition of affairs. The Constitution, section 3, Article 2, 
declares that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,” and he is provided with the means of fulfilling this obligation by 
his authority to commission all the officers of the United States, and, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint the most important of 
them and to fill vacancies. . . . The duties which are thus imposed upon him 
he is further enabled to perform by the recognition in the Constitution, and 
the creation by acts of Congress, of executive departments, which have varied 
in number from four or five to seven or eight, the heads of which are 
familiarly called cabinet ministers. These aid him in the performance of the 
great duties of his office, and represent him in a thousand acts to which it can 
hardly be supposed his personal attention is called, and thus he is enabled to 
fulfill the duty of his great department, expressed in the phrase that “he shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”  
 Is this duty limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress or of treaties 
of the United States according to their express terms, or does it include the 
rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our 
international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the 
government under the Constitution?119 
In the support of its reasoning, the Court offered other examples of the 
executive’s exercise of what Professor Henry Monaghan has called “the 
protective power” of the presidency.120 The Court, for example, cited an 
incident in which the captain of a U.S. warship “train[ed] his guns upon [a 
foreign] vessel” to secure the release of a foreign national, who had been 
wrongfully held on that vessel despite having initiated the process to become 
a naturalized U.S. citizen.121 The U.S. Secretary of State ultimately secured 
the foreign national’s release and the actions of both the ship captain and the 
Secretary of State were celebrated by Congress even though no statute authorized 
 
118 Id. at 58. 
119 Id. at 63-64. 
120 See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61-63 
(1993) (asserting that the Court has recognized, in decisions like Neagle, “an executive power to preserve, 
protect, and defend the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the national government”). 
121 Neagle, 135 U.S. at 64. 
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the government’s actions.122 In Neagle, the Court found that the same 
inherent power made it plain that the executive could, in the absence of a 
statute, “make an order for the protection of the mail and of the persons and 
lives of its carriers.”123 And it could surely “place guards upon the public 
territory to protect [federally owned] timber”124 or sue to “set aside a patent 
which had been issued for a large body of valuable land, on the ground that 
it was obtained from the government by fraud.”125 In light of these examples, 
the President’s authority to ensure the faithful execution of the laws surely 
provided authority for the executive, acting through the Attorney General, to 
provide protection for a federal officer in the performance of official duties, 
even in the absence of express statutory authority to do so.126 
II. “TAKE CARE” QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT 
The Court has used the Take Care Clause in numerous ways that are, in 
many respects, in tension. In this Part, we show that the Court has done so 
casually and at a high level of generality, without any attention to detailed 
interpretive questions about the clause’s meaning or history. The Court has 
also failed to recognize the degree to which its explication of Take Care Clause 
doctrine in distinct and sometimes conflicting ways requires judgments of degree 
and line drawing that defy judicially manageable standards. 
A. (Non)interpretation of the Take Care Clause 
The most striking feature of the Court’s Take Care Clause 
jurisprudence is that the Court almost never construes the clause, at least 
not in any conventional way. It does not look at any of the evidence one 
would expect an interpreter to consider in determining the clause’s 
relevance to the many uses to which the Court has put it. The Court has 
never taken more than a glancing look at the text, its common law 
meaning, the subsequent practical construction (“liquidation” of the 
clause’s meaning),127 the clause’s place in the broader constitutional 
 
122 Id. at 64. 
123 Id. at 65. 
124 Id. at 65-66 (discussing Wells v. Nickles, 104 U.S. 444 (1881), in which the Court upheld the 
authority of the Department of Interior to make rules and regulations to protect public land despite 
the lack of any statutory authorization). 
125 Id. at 66-67 (discussing United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888), in which the 
Court upheld the Attorney General’s right to bring suit to protect the federal government’s property 
from fraud even though no act of Congress specifically authorized such a suit). 
126 See Monaghan, supra note 120, at 62-63 (discussing the Neagle Court’s use of the Take Care 
Clause to sustain the executive’s authority to provide protection for Justice Field). 
127 See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-27 
(2003) (discussing the expectation among some prominent members of the founding generation that 
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structure, or the political context from which it emerged. While it is not 
possible here to exhume the extensive evidence of meaning, it is at least 
worth noting some of the resources that the Court might have but did 
not consider along the way. 
1. Text and Structure 
On one issue, the Court has made sense of the clause’s text and 
structure in a rather sophisticated way. Although legal academics have 
often stressed that constitutionmakers framed the clause as a duty rather 
than a grant of power,128 a well-known—and commonsensical—canon of 
textual interpretation instructs that the imposition of a duty necessarily 
implies a grant of power sufficient to see the duty fulfilled.129 Time and 
again, the Court has acknowledged just that. For example, in Myers, 
Chief Justice Taft invoked James Madison for the proposition that 
presidential removal power was necessary to enable the Chief Executive 
to carry out “his duty expressly declared in the third section of the 
Article to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”130 Similarly, 
in upholding the President’s inherent authority to assign a U.S. marshal 
to protect a circuit-riding Justice, the Court in Neagle stressed that if the 
President could not task subordinates to “represent him in a thousand 
acts to which it can hardly be supposed his personal attention is called,” 
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128 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1198 n.221 (1992) (describing Take Care Clause 
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130 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 496-97 (1789) 
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it would be impossible “to fulfil the duty . . . that ‘he shall take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed.’”131 And the list goes on.132 
At the same time, however, the Court has engaged in almost no close 
analysis of the nature or scope of the duty that underlies the implied 
power. The Court has yet to examine what the clause means by “Laws.” 
Does the duty encompass only statutes or does it also reach the 
Constitution, treaties, customary international law, and federal common 
law? Put aside the question, largely unaddressed by the Court, of 
whether the President may decline to enforce laws that he or she believes 
to be unconstitutional.133 The scope of the Take Care duty might bear on 
questions as common as whether an implied “completion power” extends 
beyond the implementation of statutory commands to constitutional 
ones.134 It is also directly relevant to the question of whether the 
President can violate customary international law or treaties.135 
Moreover, the Court’s standing decisions suggest that Article III limits 
on judicial power are informed by the Take Care Clause and its apparent 
grant of exclusive presidential power to enforce the rule of law (as such) 
within the Executive Branch.136 If Article II is more than window 
dressing in the Court’s standing cases, then one would presumably need 
to know whether the “Laws” within the President’s exclusive purview 
reach beyond statutes.  
 
131 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890). 
132 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) 
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entrusted to the President under the Take Care Clause (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
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international law); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 164 (2004) (arguing that constitutional text, history, and policy all support 
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136 See supra Section I.B. 
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Even if the Court has not written about this, legal scholarship has pored 
over the question.137 To some law professors, “Laws” means only statutes.138 
Why? Mostly, this conclusion reflects the fruits of what Akhil Amar would call 
intratextualism—a close reading of one text in the context of surrounding 
ones.139 The Take Care Clause refers to “Laws” simpliciter.140 But the 
Supremacy Clause, inter alia, draws a clear distinction among (1) “[t]his 
Constitution,” (2) “Laws . . . made in Pursuance thereof,” and (3) “Treaties.”141 
Hence, to some, the contrast between the Take Care Clause and surrounding 
provisions suggests that the former is limited to the enforcement of statutes.142 
To others, that reading seems cramped. After all, the Constitution is 
surely a “Law” of sorts,143 and the Supremacy Clause may in fact demarcate 
statutory law from other “Laws” by specifying its applicability to “Laws made 
in Pursuance []of [this Constitution].”144 In addition, reading “Laws” in the 
Take Care Clause to refer only to statutes would create a structural oddity; it 
would exhort the President to ensure faithful execution of statutes but not 
the Constitution, even as Article II’s Oath Clause simultaneously requires the 
 
137 The scholarship on the scope of the clause has largely focused on the question of whether 
the President may decline to enforce a law that he or she regards as unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS: REVIVING 
THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 16-17 (1998) (arguing that the Take Care Clause prohibits Presidents 
from refusing to enforce statutes); David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The 
President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2000, at 61, 64 
(suggesting an analytical framework for Presidents to use to determine whether they may faithfully 
decline to enforce a statute they consider unconstitutional); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential 
Review, 40 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 905, 919-22 (1989) (discussing the views of Alexander 
Hamilton, James Wilson, James Madison and Chief Justice John Marshall on the question); Peter 
L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 
2000, at 107, 108-09 (arguing that “Laws” necessarily includes the Constitution). The question has 
also arisen in connection with whether the President has a duty to defend in court a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a law that he or she believes to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Neal Devins & 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 532 (2012) (arguing 
that the Take Care Clause does not require the President to enforce unconstitutional laws); Daniel 
J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1209 (2012) (discussing the 
Executive Branch’s responsibility to defend statutes it deems unconstitutional). 
138 E.g., MAY, supra note 137, at 17. 
139 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (explaining 
the technique of holistic textual interpretation in which a reader interprets a contested word or 
phrase in light of another part of the Constitution using a similar word or phrase). 
140 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
141 Id. art. VI, cl. 2. To similar effect, Article III prescribes jurisdiction over cases “arising under 
[1] this Constitution, [2] the Laws of the United States, and [3] Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their authority.” Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
142 See, e.g., MAY, supra note 137, at 17. 
143 E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 919 (citing Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury 
v. Madison for the proposition that the Constitution is law). 
144 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 750 
(2010) (explaining that the Supremacy Clause was intended to ensure that valid federal law would 
prevail over contrary state law). 
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President to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” to “the best of 
[his or her] Ability.”145 The academic debate over the scope has grown extensive, 
invoking a range of textual, structural, functional, and historical arguments. 
It is not our aim, however, to wade into that debate. Rather, the important 
point here is that in all the cases that have invoked the Take Care Clause, the 
Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the categories of “Laws” to 
which the President’s duty extends.146 
Perhaps more striking is the Court’s omission to address what the clause 
means by saying that the laws must be “faithfully executed.” Dr. Johnson’s 
dictionary—the leading one of the founding era—defines “faithfully” to mean 
“strict adherence to duty and allegiance” and “[w]ithout failure of 
performance; honestly; exactly.”147 Even if the clause reflects the ordinary 
meaning of “faithfully” (that is, even if the clause does not adopt some kind 
of term of art), it is hard to know what “faithful” execution entails. Surely, 
the idea entails some duty of fidelity—some sort of allegiance and honesty. 
But fidelity is a relational term. One shows fidelity or faithfulness to 
something, and the clause does not say to what. The best bet is perhaps that 
the clause exhorts the President to see that the law’s executors act with fidelity 
to the laws they execute—that they adhere to the law. But the wording does 
not perfectly fit even this most plausible interpretation, which would be 
better captured by a clause that instructed the President to see that the laws 
be “faithfully observed”—a formulation that makes “Laws” more obviously 
the object to which fidelity is owed. And if one compares the Take Care 
Clause with the Oath Clause—which prescribes an oath that the President 
will “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States”148—then 
the Take Care Clause might be understood as an instruction to the President 
to ensure that the laws are implemented honestly, effectively, and without 
 
145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. Scholars who read the Take Care Clause in conjunction with 
the Oath Clause argue that the Take Care Clause applies to the Constitution. See, e.g., Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 
217, 261-62 (1994) (claiming that, when read together, the Take Care Clause and Presidential Oath 
Clause impose a duty on the President to engage in independent constitutional review when carrying 
out his or her duties); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional 
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1632 (2008) (“[I]f we read the [Take Care] Clause as implicitly requiring 
the President to execute unconstitutional laws, his execution of such laws would serve to breach the 
Constitution and not preserve it.”). 
146 For a catalog of the various ways in which the Constitution refers to “Laws,” see Edward 
T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 342-43 n.64 (2008). 
147 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. 
Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1785). Webster’s first dictionary contained a similar definition, suggesting 
that the President must act “[i]n a faithful manner; with good faith.” 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828). 
148 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
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failure of performance.149 On that view, both clauses, read in light of each other, 
point toward a general obligation of good faith, as measured by the norms and 
expectations that governed the proper exercise of executive power at the time.150 
Again, it is not our purpose here to adjudicate what the Take Care Clause 
means. What we find significant is that the Court has never parsed what 
“faithfully” means or considered, in explicit terms, the baseline(s) against 
which to measure fidelity. Consider the removal cases, in which the Court has 
said that the President must have sufficient power to fire officials who are not 
faithfully executing the law.151 In those cases, the permissibility of “good 
cause” restrictions on removal should turn directly on what “faithful” 
execution entails.152 If it requires the President to assure that subordinates 
engage in honest, scrupulous, and good faith administration, the President 
must have fairly broad removal powers that go beyond assuring that his or 
her subordinates have acted lawfully.153 But if faithful execution merely means 
adherence to law, then the removal power reserved to the President is more 
focused on firing official lawbreakers. Even on that view, however, the Court 
would need to say more than it has in order to determine what that duty 
entails. If the President and a subordinate disagree about the meaning of a 
statute about which reasonable people can differ, must the President have the 
removal power in order to assure faithful execution of the law as he or she 
sees it?154 Or is the Take Care Clause satisfied if the President can simply fire 
a subordinate for violating the plain meaning of the statute or the 
 
149 See Price, supra note 14, at 698 (arguing that because the Oath Clause does not say precisely 
to what the President owes fidelity in the execution of his or her office, the clause’s “faithful[ness]” 
requirement may simply connote a general executive duty to implement the law according “to notions 
of justice, equity, and the public interest” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
150 See id. at 697-98 (noting that the Take Care Clause’s “qualified language—requiring the 
President to ensure ‘faithful[]’ execution of the laws—invites inquiry into background normative 
expectations about proper performance of the executive function” (alteration in original)).  
151 See cases cited supra Section I.A. 
152 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 2037 n.483 (2010) (discussing potential meanings of “‘faithful’ execution of the laws” and how 
the term’s meaning affects the scope of the President’s removal power). 
153 In upholding the “good cause” limitation on the President’s authority to remove the 
independent counsels, the Court’s opinion in Morrison noted that the statutory restriction still left 
the President ample room to remove such prosecutors for not “competently performing” the 
responsibilities of his or her office in accordance with the governing statute and for “misconduct.” 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 100-452, at 37 (1987) (Conf. Rep.)). 
154 It is now commonly accepted that there may be a “best” or “most natural” answer to a legal 
question but that “reasonable” people may still disagree about what that answer is. See, e.g., Pauley 
v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991) (emphasizing that an agency’s interpretation 
“need not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards” as long as it is a 
“reasonable” interpretation); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 
(1984) (characterizing the question for a reviewing court as being “whether the Administrator’s view 
. . . is a reasonable one”). 
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unambiguous legislative intent?155 The scope of Congress’s discretion to 
establish independent agencies depends centrally on which of these conceptions 
best describes “faithful[] execut[ion]” of the laws, but the Court has never sought 
to determine what that requirement demands. 
2. Interpretive Canons 
In one prominent area—Article III standing—the Court has invoked but 
never discussed one of the most central canons of structural constitutional 
law: “the exclusivity maxim.”156 That maxim, which sits among the larger 
family of expressio unius or negative implication canons, instructs that when a 
legal instrument grants a power and specifies the mode of its implementation, 
interpreters should treat the specified mode as exclusive.157 This principle 
underlies familiar cases that reject Congress’s efforts to prescribe legislative 
procedures for making law outside of bicameralism and presentment,158 
appointing federal officers other than through the Appointments Clause,159 
or legislatively removing executive officers through means other than 
impeachment and conviction.160 The maxim reflects the commonsense idea 
that a lawmaker would not take pains to prescribe particular means of carrying 
out a power if other methods would do.161 
 
155 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”). 
156 Manning, supra note 152, at 2006-07 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 See, e.g., COOLEY, supra note 129 (explaining that “where the means for the exercise of a 
granted power are given, no other or different means can be implied” (quoting Field v. People ex rel 
McClernand, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79, 83 (1839))). 
158 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) (determining that the one-house veto 
was unconstitutional since such a procedure failed to “conform[] with the [Constitution’s] express 
procedures . . . for legislative action,” namely bicameralism and presentment). See U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 7 for the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements. 
159 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that the unorthodox 
method of appointing the Federal Elections Commission under the 1974 amendments to the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 violated the Appointments Clause because, “[u]nless their selection 
is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with 
the Clause”). The Appointments Clause of the Constitution specifies the President’s power to 
appoint “Officers of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 2. 
160 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). The Constitution specifies a highly detailed 
impeachment process. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (authorizing the House to exercise “sole Power 
of Impeachment”); id. art. I, § 3,  cl. 6 (assigning the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments”); 
id. art. II, § 4 (laying out the criteria for impeachment). 
161 See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1243 (1995) (reasoning that the expressio unius 
canon provides an appropriate framework for construing “provisions of the Constitution that both 
create entities and describe the powers those entities may wield”). 
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Though the Court does not say so, its use of the Take Care Clause in its 
standing cases162 turns on the applicability of this negative implication 
maxim. The standing cases suggest that the President’s duty to ensure faithful 
execution of the law connotes a corresponding power that is somehow 
exclusive. Hence, Congress cannot establish legal rights of action that enlist 
individuals as private attorneys general to police the legality of government 
conduct. Unless the Court can satisfy itself that the plaintiff has suffered 
some sufficiently concrete and personalized factual injury, then Congress is 
simply inviting individuals to perform a legality-enforcing function that the 
Constitution assigns to the President—and, apparently, the President alone. 
The problem of course is that the expressio unius family of canons is a 
notoriously slippery one.163 As the Court has emphasized in the statutory 
context, whether to draw a negative inference from the specification of 
something depends very much on the statement’s context.164 For example, the 
Appointments Clause specifies a process that strikes a balance giving the 
President initiative as nominator and the Senate the power to check that 
presidential initiative through advice and consent.165 On that view, Congress’s 
relieving the President of the contemplated check or imposing additional 
checks upon the President’s authority would seem to upset this balance. The 
clause’s elaborate procedures operate as both a ceiling and a floor on the 
President’s appointments power. 
It is not clear that congressional authorization of citizen suits disrupts a 
similar balance under the Take Care Clause. Even if the Court has properly 
read the Take Care Clause as creating an implied presidential power to 
exercise whatever powers are needed to fulfill the duty imposed, the clause 
nonetheless does assign a duty. And it is not hard to imagine imposing a 
nonexclusive legality-enforcing duty upon the President. The drafters may 
have insisted that the President ensure the legality or good faith of executive 
officers while not precluding Congress from specifying other means of 
policing executive legality. In other words, the President’s duty to ensure 
legality could logically have been a floor above which Congress could venture 
by creating private rights of action against federal officers or agencies. To 
 
162 See cases cited supra Section I.B. 
163 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 455 
(1989) (explaining that a textual specification may reflect purposes other than implied exclusion of 
things left unspecified). 
164 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal, 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (explaining that the expressio 
unius canon applies only when the context suggests that “that items not mentioned were excluded 
by deliberate choice, not inadvertence” (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002))); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) (making a similar point about using the 
canon in context). 
165 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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conclude that the Take Care Clause was not just a floor establishing a 
presidential duty but also a ceiling limiting congressional power, one would 
need to advance historical or functional arguments that would suggest a 
constitutional design to make the President’s duty exclusive. The Court’s 
cases have never tried to make such a showing.166 
3. History and Constitutional Meaning 
The Court’s perfunctory approach to the Take Care Clause generally 
extends to the clause’s history as well. Chief Justice Taft’s Myers opinion says 
more about the clause’s history than any other we have found, but even Taft 
only scratched the surface. Myers made passing references to what Madison 
and others said about the Take Care Clause during the famous Decision of 
1789—the removal power debate that arose around the First Congress’s 
establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs.167 Taft’s opinion also 
cited President Cleveland’s invocation of the clause in a statement urging the 
Senate to restore the removal power to him.168 The Court in Myers, however, 
did not begin to grapple with Justice McReynolds’s telling historical 
assertion, in dissent, that the New York Constitution—upon which much of 
Article II was modeled—contained its own Take Care Clause but did not give 
the Governor authority to appoint all executive officials or to remove them.169 
Interestingly, neither the opinions that read the Take Care Clause as a 
source of legislative supremacy nor those that treat it, conversely, as a source 
of prosecutorial discretion, have looked at constitutional history. As discussed 
below, the two impulses are potentially in tension if Presidents assert 
 
166 Leah Litman argues that the principle of presidential exclusivity implicit in the standing 
cases is inconsistent with areas of federal law which contemplate that other actors, including states, 
may vindicate the public interest in implementing federal law. See Litman, supra note 57, at 1308-17. 
167 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 112, 117, 122-23 (1926).  
168 Id. at 168-69. Taft also quoted Alexander Hamilton for the proposition that the enumeration 
of specific presidential powers and duties, such as the Take Care Clause, does not detract from 
Article II’s vesting of a more general “Executive Power” that includes presidential power to remove 
subordinates. Id. at 137-39 (quoting 7 WORKS OF HAMILTON 80-81 (John C. Hamilton ed., 
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1864)). 
169 See id. at 236 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) 
[The New York Constitution] then defined [the Governor’s] powers and duties—
among them, “to take care that the laws are faithfully executed to the best of his 
ability.” It further provided, “that the Treasurer of this State shall be appointed by Act 
of the Legislature;” and entrusted the appointment of civil and military officers to a 
council. The Governor had no power to remove them, but apparently nobody thought 
he would be unable to execute the laws through officers designated by another. 
(quoting N.Y. CONST. §§ 9, 12 (amended 1821)). 
For a similar argument, see, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 97-98 (2009). 
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prosecutorial discretion to forbear from enforcing federal statutes in a categorical 
way that, in effect, creates novel exceptions to otherwise unqualified statutory 
commands.170 One way or the other, history may shed light on the question. 
Some argue that U.S. constitutionmakers adopted the Take Care Clause with 
an evident purpose to codify the anti-dispensation and anti-suspension 
principles that emerged from the Glorious Revolution in England.171 Others, 
however, see the historical record as more mixed. Professor Zachary Price, for 
instance, notes that several state constitutions at the time of the founding had 
adopted more explicit anti-prerogative clauses, that the Philadelphia 
Convention rejected an anti-suspension clause, and that no one in the 
constitutionmaking process explicitly equated the Take Care Clause with an 
anti-prerogative impulse.172 And even if the clause was meant to preclude the 
President’s exercise of dispensing or suspending authority, historical practice 
might provide insight into what our legal system has viewed as a permissible 
(perhaps inevitable) assertion of prosecutorial discretion rather than an exercise 
of obsolete royal prerogative.173 Whatever the right answer to any of these 
questions, what is telling is that the Court has essentially omitted to consider 
evidence of the received understanding of the Take Care Clause, either at the 
time of the clause’s adoption or as our political and legal system came to 
clarify and settle its meaning over time.174 
 
170 See infra text accompanying notes 176–77. 
171 See, e.g., MAY, supra note 137, at 16 (reading the Take Care Clause, in historical context, as 
reflecting a purpose to reject a variety of English royal prerogatives used “to evade the will of 
Parliament”); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of the Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
781, 803-08 (2013) (drawing a similar conclusion). But see Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning 
of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 726 n.113 (disputing the claim that the clause serves as 
the constitutional analogue to “English and state constitution prohibitions on dispensing and 
suspending the laws”). 
172 Price, supra note 14, at 692-94. Professor Price ultimately concludes, however, that the best 
reading of the early evidence still cuts against presidential dispensing and suspending powers—a 
conclusion that, in his view, is confirmed by an early circuit court decision and by the previously 
discussed Kendall decision. See id. at 694-96 (discussing United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342), and Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 
(1838)). See supra text accompanying notes 111–14 for a discussion of Kendall. 
173 See Price, supra note 14, at 712-16 (discussing nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
executive and judicial precedents concerning the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); see also 
Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in 
the Early Republic, 4 L. & HIST. REV. 223, 238 (1986) (discussing the Jefferson Administration’s use 
of prosecutorial discretion). 
174 Similarly, in its standing cases, the Court has never suggested that anyone in the founding 
generation understood the Take Care Clause as imposing an implied limit on Article III judicial 
power. Nor has the Court invoked any subsequent course of practice treating the clause as a 
constraint on Congress’s power to create previously unknown rights of action. The omissions here 
may reflect the novelty of the Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause as a source of standing 
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B. Consistency and Line Drawing 
We have already noted the tensions among the Court’s deployments of 
the Take Care Clause. Some of these tensions highlight another key feature 
of the Court’s Take Care cases. Almost all of the relevant cases turn on 
questions of degree and thus require inscrutable line drawing between what is 
permissible and impermissible under the Court’s understanding of the clause. 
Consider the example of the relationship between prosecutorial discretion 
and the scruple against executive dispensation or suspension of the law. Recall 
that the Court has traced the President’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
to the Take Care Clause.175 As noted, the Obama Administration has relied 
on such discretion to justify its (1) forbearance from enforcing federal 
marijuana possession laws in certain circumstances, (2) deferment of certain 
regulatory requirements under the Affordable Care Act, and (3) adoption of 
“deferred action” programs for classes of undocumented immigrants with 
strong equitable claims to continued residence by virtue of specified personal 
circumstances or ties to citizens or permanent residents.176 To some, such 
exercises of power too closely resemble the royal prerogatives proscribed by 
the Take Care Clause—those which the Crown invoked to suspend Acts of 
Parliament or grant individuals dispensation from compliance with law when 
equity so required.177 
It is not our purpose to adjudicate in detail the merits of that question, 
which like most constitutional questions, has arguments on both sides.178 
Rather, what is significant here is that if the Court’s starting principles are 
both correct—if the Take Care Clause justifies prosecutorial discretion but 
also condemns executive dispensation or suspension—then there may be no 
principled metric for identifying when a valid exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion shades into an impermissible exercise of dispensation or suspension 
 
doctrine—a proposition that did not find its way into the U.S. Reports until about three decades 
ago. See supra Section I.B. 
175 See supra Section I.C. 
176 Price, supra note 14. As noted, after granting certiorari on whether one such deferred action 
program (DAPA) violated the Take Care Clause, the Court left the issue unresolved when it affirmed 
the decision below by an equally divided Court.  See supra note 19. 
177 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 171, at 808, 835 (arguing that the Take Care Clause imposes 
a duty on the President to enforce all valid congressional acts); Price, supra note 14, at 705 (arguing that the 
executive impermissibly exercises obsolete royal prerogatives when prospectively licensing illegal conduct 
or adopting a policy of nonenforcement towards entire categories of offenders). 
178 See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1216 (2014) (arguing that President Obama’s decision to defer enforcing certain 
immigration laws is consistent with the requirements of Article II); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Response: In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
59, 62-64 (2013) (defending the Obama Administration’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion through 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA)). 
1864 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1835 
power. Some prosecutorial discretion is inevitable;179 if the executive cannot 
plausibly enforce the law against all who violate it, then enforcement agencies 
must set prosecution priorities.180 
While Professor Price has argued that announcing such priorities 
categorically in advance may constitute a form of dispensation,181 it is not 
entirely clear why the executive’s articulation of such limits makes the exercise 
invalid. Imagine, for example, that the FDA has limited resources and 
concludes that corn containing twenty ppm or less of aflatoxin poses a limited 
risk of “adulteration” within the meaning of the FDCA.182 If the agency thinks 
it unwise to devote scarce enforcement resources to such low-risk cases, why 
would the further act of announcing that policy transform sound prosecutorial 
discretion into unconstitutional dispensation?183 Perhaps there will be cases 
in which the degree or character of the executive’s announced forbearance is 
so great that it creates a sense of establishing an unauthorized exception to 
an otherwise unqualified statutory prohibition—in effect, an executive 
amendment of the statute at issue. But identifying the line between a 
permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion and an impermissible 
dispensation of the law seems very much like a matter of degree, the limits of 
which are subjective and difficult to define in a principled way.184 
Such tensions and line-drawing problems recur in the Take Care Clause 
case law because of the undefined nature of the duty or power at issue. 
Youngstown tells us that the President has no inherent power to seize steel mills 
in order to implement appropriations bills that call upon the President to 
 
179 Kate Andrias has written that, given the broad delegations of regulatory power that mark 
the modern administrative state, “presidential involvement in the enforcement of statutes involves 
a considerable degree of law-shaping, if not lawmaking.” Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement 
Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1114-15 (2013). 
180 See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653, 670 (1985) (acknowledging that “the executive has the power to set enforcement priorities 
and to allocate resources to those problems that, in the judgment of the executive, seem most 
severe”). 
181 Price, supra note 14, at 705. 
182 See 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2012) (defining “adulterated” food as that which “bears or contains 
any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health” but not “if the 
quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health”). 
183 Cf. Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young 
and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 154-55 (1992) (discussing the virtues of allowing 
agencies to announce prosecutorial policy in advance, such as curbing abuses of agency discretion 
that can result from an unstructured approach). 
184 In this sense, the problem bears a family resemblance to that of differentiating a permissible 
statutory delegation of executive discretion from an impermissible statutory delegation of legislative 
power. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (noting that “we have 
‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law’” (quoting Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
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purchase the tools needed to prosecute an armed conflict.185 Even though the 
President made a finding that the seizure of plants idled by strikes was essential 
to ensure the procurement of the necessary weapons and ammunition,186 the 
principle of legislative supremacy implicit in the Take Care Clause denied the 
President authority to implement what the Court regarded as “a presidential 
policy [to] be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.”187 
In sharp contrast, recall that Neagle read the Take Care Clause to give the 
President some degree of power to act, without prior statutory authority, to 
protect “the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution 
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature 
of the government under the Constitution.”188 Indeed, in a complex world in 
which Congress cannot foresee and provide for every implemental detail, 
some implied “completion” power seems almost inevitable.189 Surely, if 
Congress appropriated money for the President to purchase a warship, the 
President could rightly claim inherent power to carry that command into 
execution by entering into procurement contracts, even if Congress did not 
enact a statute authorizing the President to do so. Where the line falls 
between the President’s permissible exercise of a completion power and 
impermissible exercise of legislative power reserved to Congress seems 
difficult, if not impossible, to define in the abstract.190 
Finally, the Court’s standing cases also present a difficult line-drawing 
problem—though, in this instance, not one caused by a tension in the Take 
Care Clause cases. As noted, if Congress authorizes someone without a 
concrete and immediate injury in fact to bring a federal lawsuit challenging 
agency action, the Court regards the resultant action as an intrusion on the 
President’s apparently exclusive authority to ensure faithful execution of the 
laws.191 In this vein, the Court has consistently made clear that an abstract 
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186 Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 10, 1952). 
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188 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890). 
189 See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 115, at 2305. 
190 In the period between his presidency and chief justiceship, Taft offered a formulation of 
presidential power that includes a completion power: 
[T]he President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced 
to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as 
proper and necessary to its exercise. Such specific grant must be either in the Federal 
Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139-40 (1916) (emphasis 
added). As Henry Monaghan has written, however, Taft’s formulation “marks—but does not define—
a boundary between what can fairly be described as presidential discretion in implementing legislation 
and unauthorized presidential law-making.” Monaghan, supra note 120, at 40. 
191 See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note 162.  
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interest in the “proper application of the Constitution and laws” cannot 
sustain Article III standing.192 
Even accepting the validity of that position, no principled metric exists 
for determining just how concrete an injury must be before the Court will 
treat it as proper Article III business rather than an intrusion upon the legality-
enforcing function that the Take Care Clause assigns to the President.193 Recall 
that in Lujan, the Court invalidated a citizen’s suit under the Endangered 
Species Act because the plaintiffs did not have concrete enough plans to see 
the endangered species whose habitats would allegedly be affected by a 
violation of the Act.194 The Court, in effect, would not permit standing 
because the plaintiffs had not purchased plane tickets to visit the affected 
sites. However, as Cass Sunstein has asked, “[i]f a court [confronted with a 
Lujan action] could set aside executive action at the behest of plaintiffs with 
a plane ticket, why does the Take Care Clause forbid it from doing so at the 
behest of plaintiffs without a ticket?”195 In the absence of a firm line identifying 
where Article III power begins and the Take Care Clause obligation ends, the 
Court’s standing doctrine blurs at the margins.196 
In short, perhaps because of internal tension within the doctrine, or 
perhaps because of the inherently imprecise nature of the Take Care Clause 
obligation, line-drawing problems are endemic to the Court’s Take Care 
Clause cases. Hence, identifying what the clause permits—and what it 
forbids—will necessarily turn upon uncertain judgment calls about which 
reasonable people can presumably differ. The Court, however, has not 
acknowledged these internal tensions nor, for the most part, grappled with 
the implications of the interpretive and doctrinal uncertainty that the clause 
has generated in the Court’s own hands. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Take Care Clause is both particular and delphic. It imposes a specific 
duty on the President but says very little about what that duty entails. The 
Court, however, has treated the clause as having firm and definite content. 
The Take Care Clause underwrites the President’s removal power, draws a 
line between judicial and executive power, offers a source for the President’s 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, establishes legislative supremacy, and 
gives the President a measure of completion power. With rare exceptions, the 
Court has identified these diverse functions without any effort to ground its 
decisions in a careful reading of the text, structure, or history of the clause. 
Nor has the Court sought to reconcile its various Take Care Clause doctrines 
with one another or troubled itself about its own capacity to resolve the 
intractable line-drawing problems that its doctrine has created. Instead, the 
Take Care Clause has been a placeholder for broad judicial judgments about 
the appropriate relations among the branches in our constitutional system—
like the Court’s own Key Number for freestanding separation-of-powers 
principles. 
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